Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2022

Volume: 210

Issue: C

Authors (3)

Bandhu, Sarvesh (not in RePEc) Mondal, Bishwajyoti (not in RePEc) Pramanik, Anup (Shiv Nadar University)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

View Full Article View on IDEAS/RePEc

Abstract

In this paper, we provide a complete characterization of preference domains on which the Unanimity with Status-quo rule is strategy-proof. Further, we introduce a notion of “conflicting preference domains” and show that the Unanimity with Status-quo rule defined over these domains is strategy-proof.

Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains

Authors (3)

Abstract

Technical Details