Unintended consequences of enforcement in illicit markets

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 125
Issue: 2
Pages: 295-297

Authors (2)

Prieger, James E. (Pepperdine University) Kulick, Jonathan (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Legal enforcement of bans on goods can reduce the size of the black market but lead to greater violence by increasing revenue in the illicit market. However, the link between enforcement and violence is not as simple as is suggested by the textbook model, even for a competitive market. Nevertheless, under plausible assumptions more enforcement on trafficking in the illicit good leads to more violence.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:295-297
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29