Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2024
Volume: 145
Issue: C
Pages: 426-450

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Condorcet domains are sets of preference orders such that the majority relation corresponding to any profile of preferences from the domain is acyclic. The best known examples in economics are the single-peaked, the single-crossing, and the group separable domains. We survey the latest developments in the area since Monjardet's magisterial overview (2009), provide some new results and offer two conjectures concerning unsolved problems. The main goal of the presentation is to illuminate the rich internal structure of the class of maximal Condorcet domains. In an appendix, we present the complete classification of all maximal Condorcet domains on four alternatives obtained by Dittrich (2018).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:426-450
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29