Do Short Sellers Trade on Private Information or False Information?

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2018
Volume: 53
Issue: 3
Pages: 997-1023

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate whether short sellers contribute toward the informational efficiency of market prices by trading on their private information or destabilize market prices by trading on rumors and false information. We find that short-selling activities are considerably informative about future stock returns when there is a higher likelihood of private information in stocks, as measured by insider-trading activities. Short sellers also bring considerable additional information to the market that is not fully captured by contemporaneous insider trading. Overall, these results suggest that on average, short sellers bring informational efficiency to market prices rather than destabilize them.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:53:y:2018:i:03:p:997-1023_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29