Median stable matchings in two-sided markets

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2016
Volume: 97
Issue: C
Pages: 64-69

Authors (4)

Chen, Peter (not in RePEc) Egesdal, Michael (not in RePEc) Pycia, Marek (Universität Zürich) Yenmez, M. Bumin (Washington University in St. L...)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We show that generalized median stable matchings exist in many-to-many matching markets when contracts are strong substitutes and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:97:y:2016:i:c:p:64-69
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29