Social norms, regulation, and environmental risk

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2015
Volume: 129
Issue: C
Pages: 22-24

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We add social norms into Laffont’s mechanism designed for environmental risk. We find with endogenous social norms and asymmetric information about personal norms, the optimal contract induces more (less) effort from the “green” (“brown”) firm.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:129:y:2015:i:c:p:22-24
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29