Are fairness opinions fair? The case of mergers and acquisitions

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2009
Volume: 91
Issue: 2
Pages: 179-207

Authors (3)

Kisgen, Darren J. (not in RePEc) "QJ" Qian, Jun (Shanghai Jiao Tong University) Song, Weihong (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Over the period 1994-2003, 80% of targets and 37% of acquirers obtain a third-party assessment of the fairness of a merger or acquisition. These fairness opinions do not affect deal outcomes when used by targets, but they affect deal outcomes when used by acquirers. The deal premium is lower in transactions if the acquirer obtains a fairness opinion, and is further reduced if multiple advisors provide an opinion. However, the acquirer's announcement-period return is 2.3% lower if the acquirer has a fairness opinion, especially if the acquirer pays a high premium, indicating that investors are skeptical of these transactions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:91:y:2009:i:2:p:179-207
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29