Restricted dominant unanimity and social discounting

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 117
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Dong-Xuan, Bach (not in RePEc) Qu, Xiangyu (Université Paris-Saclay)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper addresses the intricate challenge of establishing social discount rates across far-reaching generations, particularly in the face of divergent social viewpoints. We introduce several principles related to Dominant Unanimity, which enable non-dictatorial social discounting, and we characterize different ranges of social discount factors based on individual one-period discount factors. Our findings suggest that societies adhering to these principles exhibit varying degrees of patience and different ranges of social discounting. This approach provides theoretical pathways to enhance the consideration of distant future welfare, particularly in the context of long-term economic activities and policies.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:117:y:2025:i:c:s0304406825000175
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29