Emissions trading with profit-neutral permit allocations

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2013
Volume: 98
Issue: C
Pages: 85-99

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of an emissions trading scheme (ETS) on equilibrium emissions, output, price, market concentration, and profits in a generalized Cournot model. We develop formulae for the number of emissions permits that have to be freely allocated to firms to neutralize the profit impact of the ETS. We show that its profit impact is usually limited: in a Cournot oligopoly with constant marginal costs, total industry profits are preserved so long as freely allocated permits cover a fraction of initial emissions that does not exceed the industry's Herfindahl index.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:98:y:2013:i:c:p:85-99
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29