Buy high, sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2009
Volume: 33
Issue: 5
Pages: 914-924

Authors (4)

Cheung, Yan-Leung (not in RePEc) Qi, Yuehua (not in RePEc) Raghavendra Rau, P. (University of Cambridge) Stouraitis, Aris (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms' length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998-2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms' length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms' length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms' length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:33:y:2009:i:5:p:914-924
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29