An ill wind? Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 135
Issue: 2
Pages: 379-398

Authors (4)

Dai, Yunhao (not in RePEc) Rau, P. Raghavendra (University of Cambridge) Stouraitis, Aris (not in RePEc) Tan, Weiqiang (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using multiple measures of attack proximity, we show that CEOs employed at firms located near terrorist attacks earn an average pay increase of 12% after the attack relative to CEOs at firms located far from attacks. CEOs at terrorist attack-proximate firms prefer cash-based compensation increases (e.g., salary and bonus) over equity-based compensation (e.g., options and stocks granted). The effect is causal and it is larger when the bargaining power of the CEO is high. Other executives and workers do not receive a terrorist attack premium.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:135:y:2020:i:2:p:379-398
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29