Employee Initiative and Managerial Control

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2012
Volume: 4
Issue: 3
Pages: 171-211

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

I analyze the impact of managerial involvement and the allocation of authority on employee initiative in a setting where both a manager and an employee can originate new ideas for implementation. I show that employee initiative is maximized through the combination of formal authority and limited but positive levels of involvement by the manager, a result which thus qualifies the motivational advantages of both formal delegation and a hands-off management strategy. This result arises through an indirect monitoring role played by managerial involvement that has been absent in previous frameworks, and the implications of which for the optimal organizational arrangement are further analyzed. (JEL D23, M12, M54)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:3:p:171-211
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29