Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
Year: 2009
Volume: 1
Issue: 1
Pages: 178-218

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When citizens in a poor constrained society are unequally endowed, they are likely to find it hard to agree on reforms, even though the status quo hurts them collectively. Each citizen group or constituency prefers reforms that expand its opportunities, but in an unequal society, this will typically hurt another constituency's rents. Competitive rent preservation ensures no comprehensive reform path may command broad support. The roots of underdevelopment may therefore lie in the natural tendency toward rent preservation in a divided society. (JEL D72, O10, O17)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmac:v:1:y:2009:i:1:p:178-218
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29