Compatibility, network effects, and collusion

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 151
Issue: C
Pages: 39-43

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

I consider a market with network effects in which firms collude on prices. Depending on the fixed costs for achieving compatibility, there may be a non-monotone relationship between firms’ decisions to make their products compatible and their intertemporal preferences.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:151:y:2017:i:c:p:39-43
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29