Piracy in a two-sided software market

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2013
Volume: 88
Issue: C
Pages: 78-89

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of software piracy in a two-sided-market setting. Software platforms attract developers and users to maximize their profits. The equilibrium price structure is affected by piracy: license fees to developers are higher with more software protection but the impact on user prices is ambiguous. A conflict between platforms and software developers over software protection may arise: whereas one side benefits from better protection, the other party loses out. Under platform compatibility, this conflict is no longer present.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:88:y:2013:i:c:p:78-89
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29