Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
Abstract The aim of this paper is to summarize the extant theory as it relates to the economics of trademark, and to give some suggestions for further research with reference to distinct streams of literature. The proposed line of study inevitably looks at the complex relationship between signs and economics. Trademark is a sign introduced to remedy a market failure. It facilitates purchase decisions by indicating the provenance of the goods, so that consumers can identify specific quality attributes deriving from their own, or others', past experience. Trademark holders, on their part, have an incentive to invest in quality because they will be able to reap the benefits in terms of reputation. In other words, trademark law becomes an economic device which, opportunely designed, can produce incentives for maximizing market efficiency. This role must, of course, be recognized, as a vast body of literature has done, with its many positive economic consequences. Nevertheless, trademark appears to have additional economic effects that should be equally recognized: it can determine the promotion of market power and the emergence of rent‐seeking behaviours. It gives birth to an idiosyncratic economics of signs where very strong protection tends to be assured, even though the welfare effects are as yet poorly understood. In this domain much remains to be done and the challenge to researchers is open.