Tax compliance after an audit: Higher or lower?

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2023
Volume: 207
Issue: C
Pages: 157-171

Authors (2)

Kasper, Matthias (not in RePEc) Rablen, Matthew D. (University of Sheffield)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

What is the compliance effect of experiencing a tax audit? Empirical studies typically report a positive effect, while laboratory experiments frequently report a negative effect. We show experimentally that whether a tax audit increases or decreases subsequent compliance hinges on the balance of learning opportunities, misperception of audit risk, and the confounding effect of censoring. After an audit, taxpayers lower their perceived risk of audit – consistent with a bomb-crater effect – when audit selection is exogenous. However, for an endogenous audit rule under which taxpayers can learn to reduce their audit risk by reporting higher income, learning effects outweigh probability misperception, resulting in an increase in post-audit tax compliance. Finally, we show that accounting for censoring effects can eliminate on its own the negative post-audit compliance effect frequently observed in laboratory experiments.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:207:y:2023:i:c:p:157-171
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29