Revenue non-equivalence between auctions with soft and hard closing mechanisms: New evidence from Yahoo!

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2012
Volume: 81
Issue: 1
Pages: 129-136

Authors (2)

Glover, Brent (not in RePEc) Raviv, Yaron (Claremont McKenna College)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We use a unique dataset to examine the revenue differences between auctions with a hard-close ending rule versus those with a soft-close ending rule. We find that selling items using the soft-close rule increases the selling price by an amount between $25 and $44 (or 13–20 percent) over the hard-close format. One possible theoretical explanation for these results is that the hard-close ending rule accommodates the practice of sniping, which leads to a lower expected selling price. We find empirically that a lack of experience could help to explain why, in spite of the revenue differences, some sellers select the hard-close ending rule.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:81:y:2012:i:1:p:129-136
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29