Two-sided altruism, Lindahl equilibrium, and Pareto optimality in overlapping generations models

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2006
Volume: 27
Issue: 3
Pages: 729-736

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper extends the Samuelsonian overlapping generations general equilibrium framework to encompass a variety of altruistic preferences by recasting it into a Lindahl equilibrium framework. The First and the Second Welfare theorems hold for Lindahl equilibrium with respect to the Malinvaud optimality criterion but not with respect to the Pareto optimality criterion. A complete characterization of Pareto optimal allocations is provided using the Lindahl equilibrium prices. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:729-736
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29