Public Employees as Swing Voters: Empirical Evidence on Opposition to Public Reform

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2004
Volume: 119
Issue: 3_4
Pages: 281-310

Authors (2)

Jørn Rattsø (not in RePEc) Rune J. Sørensen (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Reform offers economic gains for society at large, but can represent a threat to the interests of public employees. Public sector reform faces opposition from voters employed in public sector. Norwegian data allow for an analysis this interpretation. Survey data show that public employees prefer less reform than the rest of the population. The voting behavior of public employees is more sensitive to reform than is that of other voters (the swing voter hypothesis), and hence: shares of public employees in a local jurisdiction have a negative impact on the probability of reform.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:119:y:2004:i:3_4:p:281-310
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29