Anatomy of a Contract Change

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2016
Volume: 106
Issue: 2
Pages: 316-58

Authors (3)

Rajshri Jayaraman (not in RePEc) Debraj Ray (New York University (NYU)) Francis de Véricourt (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study a contract change for tea pluckers on an Indian plantation, with a higher government-stipulated baseline wage. Incentive piece rates were lowered or kept unchanged. Yet, in the following month, output increased by 20 to 80 percent. This response contradicts the standard model and several variants, is only partly explicable by greater supervision, and appears to be "behavioral." But in subsequent months, the increase is comprehensively reversed. Though not an unequivocal indictment of "behavioral" models, these findings suggest that nonstandard responses may be ephemeral, and should ideally be tracked over an extended period of time. (JEL D82, D86, J33, J41, J43, O13, Q12)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:2:p:316-58
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29