Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 1993
Volume: 83
Issue: 5
Pages: 1281-1302

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

People like to help those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes rejecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person maximizes the other's material payoffs, and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other's payoffs. It is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium. If payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of Nash equilibria. Several economic examples are considered and possible welfare implications of fairness are explored. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:83:y:1993:i:5:p:1281-1302
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29