Modelling upstream and downstream market power in bilateral oligopoly

C-Tier
Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2017
Volume: 49
Issue: 10
Pages: 1016-1031

Authors (3)

Seongjin Park (not in RePEc) Chanjin Chung (not in RePEc) Kellie Curry Raper (Oklahoma State University)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article develops a general model that estimates market power exertion in a bilateral market relationship for processors and retailers where each may also have market power in their primary input market and output markets, respectively. Monte Carlo experiments are used to generate industry data for market structures such as perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, bilateral imperfect competition with an integrated processor/retailer, bilateral imperfect competition with separate processor and retailer, and bilateral imperfect competition with four adjacent upstream and downstream markets. Then, new empirical industrial organization models are estimated using the data with models that match the market structure under which the data were generated (true) and with models that reflect alternative market structures (alternative). The general model is derived using the production function approach without imposing the fixed proportion assumption. Monte Carlo simulation results indicate that the general model is preferred to alternative models that presume competitive behaviour by processors in primary input procurement and by retailers in the output market. Results indicate that less flexible models lead to biased market power estimates in the presence of market power in the corresponding input and output markets.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:taf:applec:v:49:y:2017:i:10:p:1016-1031
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29