Standardization across Markets and Entry.

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 1989
Volume: 37
Issue: 4
Pages: 359-71

Authors (2)

Matutes, Carmen (not in RePEc) Regibeau, Pierre (Imperial College)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In many industries, consumers combine several components to build their own "system." This paper analyzes the incentives to standardize among firms selling a single component to consumers who have already acquired the rest of the system. By selling a component that can work with different systems, a firm credibly commits itself to charging the same price in all the submarkets. It is shown that this can be an optimal strategy for an incumbent who wants to restrict the scope of entry. Copyright 1989 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:37:y:1989:i:4:p:359-71
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29