Director networks and takeovers

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance
Year: 2014
Volume: 28
Issue: C
Pages: 218-234

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the duration of the negotiations is shorter. Connected targets more frequently accept offers that involve equity. Directors of the target firm (who are not interlocked) have a better chance to be invited to the board of the combined firm in connected M&As. While connections have a clear impact on the takeover strategy and process, we do not find evidence that the market acknowledges connections between bidders and targets as the announcement returns are not statistically different from those bidders and targets which are ex ante not connected.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:corfin:v:28:y:2014:i:c:p:218-234
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29