Politics, partisanship and the power to veto: does gubernatorial line-item veto power affect state budgets?

C-Tier
Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 50
Issue: 33
Pages: 3546-3559

Authors (2)

Joseph McCormack (not in RePEc) Yaniv Reingewertz (University of Haifa)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

How does line-item veto (LIV) power affect a governor’s ability to structure the state budget? Is LIV power only relevant as a partisan tool? Is it still relevant when the state legislature can override the veto? We use a rich disaggregated data set to test the effect of the gubernatorial LIV on state budgets, controlling for political factors such as party affiliation of the governor and legislature, minority status of the governor, and the legislature’s ability to override a LIV. Our results suggest that LIV power has very weak influence, if any, on governors’ ability to influence state budgets.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:taf:applec:v:50:y:2018:i:33:p:3546-3559
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29