Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2009
Volume: 65
Issue: 2
Pages: 572-585

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We report experimental results on a series of ten one-shot two-person 3x3 normal form games with unique equilibrium in pure strategies played by non-economists. In contrast to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, a majority of actions taken coincided with the equilibrium prediction (70.2%) and were best-responses to subjects' stated beliefs (67.2%). In constant-sum games, 78% of actions taken were predicted by the equilibrium model, outperforming simple K-level reasoning models. We discuss how non-trivial game characteristics related to risk aversion, efficiency concerns and social preferences may affect the predictive value of different models in simple normal form games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:572-585
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29