Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2013
Volume: 148
Issue: 6
Pages: 2467-2482

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [3] characterize preferences over menus of lotteries that can be represented by the use of a unique subjective state space and a prior. We investigate what would be the appropriate version of Dynamic Consistency in such a setup. The condition we find, which we call Flexibility Consistency, is linked to a comparative theory of preference for flexibility. When the subjective state space is finite, we show that Flexibility Consistency is equivalent to a subjective version of Dynamic Consistency and that it implies that the decision maker is a subjective state space Bayesian updater. Later we characterize when a collection of signals can be interpreted as a partition of the subjective state space of the decision maker.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2467-2482
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29