Herding versus Hotelling: Market Entry with Costly Information

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2008
Volume: 17
Issue: 3
Pages: 607-631

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Why do businesses such as fast‐food restaurants, coffee shops, and hotels cluster? In the classic analysis of Hotelling, firms cluster to attract consumers who have travel costs. We present an alternative model where firms cluster because one firm is free riding on another firm's information about market demand. One consequence of this free riding is that an informed firm might forego a market that it knows to be profitable. Furthermore, an uninformed firm might earn higher profits when research costs are high, because it can credibly commit to ignorance.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:17:y:2008:i:3:p:607-631
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29