Regulation of price increases

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization
Year: 2017
Volume: 50
Issue: C
Pages: 186-213

Authors (2)

Ridley, David B. (Duke University) Zhang, Su (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

U.S. federal and state governments rarely regulate healthcare price levels, but do regulate price changes for pharmaceuticals, hospitals, and health insurance. Previous research showed that limiting price increases can raise launch prices and reduce both profit and social welfare, assuming consumers are myopic. We show that with forward-looking consumers, limiting price increases can have the opposite effect, that is, launch prices fall while profit and social welfare rise. Ironically, inflation regulation can cause inflation to rise, but only because firms are reducing launch prices to make the regulation bind and credibly commit to future prices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:indorg:v:50:y:2017:i:c:p:186-213
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29