Competition and physician-enabled demand: The role of managed care

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2009
Volume: 72
Issue: 1
Pages: 463-474

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Recent organizational changes in the health care sector promote greater patient participation in their treatment decisions. How physicians respond to patient-initiated requests for treatment is an issue of considerable policy interest. To study this phenomenon, we introduce the notion of physician-enabled demand and examine empirically whether this behavior responds to competitive pressures in the market and financial incentives associated with different physician payment mechanisms. We find that physician-enabled demand increases with more competition under fee-for-service reimbursement, but decreases with greater competition under managed care. This asymmetric response is quite consistent with our conceptual framework and at odds with alternative interpretations.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:72:y:2009:i:1:p:463-474
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29