Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2008
Volume: 98
Issue: 1
Pages: 38-71

Authors (4)

Thierry Post (not in RePEc) Martijn J. van den Assem (not in RePEc) Guido Baltussen (New York University (NYU)) Richard H. Thaler (University of Chicago)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular TV game show "Deal or No Deal" and related classroom experiments. Contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory, the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes. Our results point to reference-dependent choice theories such as prospect theory, and suggest that path-dependence is relevant, even when the choice problems are simple and well defined, and when large real monetary amounts are at stake. (JEL D81)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:1:p:38-71
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24