Drafting the Great Army: The Political Economy of Conscription in Napoleonic France

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic History
Year: 2023
Volume: 83
Issue: 4
Pages: 1057-1100

Authors (2)

Rouanet, Louis (University of Texas-El Paso) Piano, Ennio E. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Napoléon Bonaparte revolutionized the practice of war with his reliance on a mass national army and large-scale conscription. This system faced one major obstacle: draft evasion. This article discusses Napoléon’s response to widespread draft evasion. First, we show that draft dodging rates across France varied with geographic characteristics. Second, we provide evidence that the regime adopted a strategy of discriminatory conscription enforcement by setting a lower (higher) conscription rate for those regions where the enforcement of conscription was more (less) costly. Finally, we show that this strategy resulted in a rapid fall in draft dodging rates across France.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jechis:v:83:y:2023:i:4:p:1057-1100_4
Journal Field
Economic History
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29