A pricing mechanism to jointly mitigate market power and environmental externalities in electricity markets

A-Tier
Journal: Energy Economics
Year: 2023
Volume: 121
Issue: C

Authors (5)

Varawala, Lamia (not in RePEc) Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza (not in RePEc) Dán, György (not in RePEc) Bunn, Derek (not in RePEc) Rosellón, Juan (Centro de Investigación y Doce...)

Score contribution per author:

0.804 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The electricity industry has been one of the first to face technological changes motivated by sustainability concerns. Whilst efficiency aspects of market design have tended to focus upon market power concerns, the new policy challenges emphasise sustainability. We argue that market designs need to develop remedies for market conduct integrated with regard to environmental externalities. Accordingly, we develop an incentive-based market clearing mechanism using a power network representation with a distinctive feature of incomplete information regarding generation costs. The shortcomings of price caps to mitigate market power, in this context, are overcome with the proposed mechanism.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eneeco:v:121:y:2023:i:c:s0140988323001445
Journal Field
Energy
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-29