Good Principals or Good Peers? Parental Valuation of School Characteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, and the Incentive Effects of Competition among Jurisdictions

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2006
Volume: 96
Issue: 4
Pages: 1333-1350

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a multicommunity model, high-income families cluster together in any equilibrium, and cluster near effective schools if effectiveness is an important component of community desirability. Governmental fragmentation facilitates this residential sorting. Thus, if parents prefer effective schools, income correlates with effectiveness in high-choice-market equilibrium. I examine the distribution of student background and test scores across schools within metropolitan areas that differ in the structure of educational governance. I find little indication of the ?effectiveness sorting? that is predicted if parents choose neighborhoods for the efficacy of the local schools. This suggests caution about the productivity implications of school choice policies. (JEL H73, I21, R21, R23)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:4:p:1333-1350
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29