Limit-pricing as Bertrand equilibrium

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2002
Volume: 19
Issue: 4
Pages: 811-822

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with increasing returns to scale where one of the firms have a cost advantage and prices vary over a grid. We find that typically more than one equilibria exist. However, there are only two perfect equilibria. Moreover, as the size of the grid becomes small, both these equilibria converge to the limit-pricing outcome.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:811-822
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29