Capital Structure and Regulation: Do Ownership and Regulatory Independence Matter?

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2011
Volume: 20
Issue: 2
Pages: 517-564

Authors (4)

Bernardo Bortolotti (not in RePEc) Carlo Cambini (not in RePEc) Laura Rondi (Politecnico di Torino) Yossi Spiegel (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the effect of ownership structure and regulatory independence on the interaction between capital structure and regulated prices using a comprehensive panel data of publicly traded European utilities. We find that firms in our sample tend to have a higher leverage if they are privately controlled and regulated by an independent regulatory agency. Moreover, the leverage of these firms has a positive and significant effect on their regulated prices, but not vice versa. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately controlled regulated firms use leverage strategically to obtain better regulatory outcomes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:20:y:2011:i:2:p:517-564
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29