Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists.

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1997
Volume: 105
Issue: 2
Pages: 284-329

Authors (2)

Roth, Alvin E (Stanford University) Xing, Xiaolin (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The potential transactions evaluated in labor markets before equilibrium is identified involve rejected offers. After an initial phase in which many offers can be made simultaneously, a new offer cannot be made until an outstanding offer is rejected, so even a small time required to process offers and rejections may cause bottlenecks. In many labor markets, this means that transactions have to be finalized before the market clears. A firm needs to consider the likelihood that its offer will be accepted, since if its offer is rejected other potential employees may become unavailable in the interim. The analysis is carried out in connection with the market for clinical psychologists. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:105:y:1997:i:2:p:284-329
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29