Dynamic electoral competition with voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 232
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Lockwood, Ben (not in RePEc) Le, Minh (not in RePEc) Rockey, James (University of Birmingham)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper explores the implications of voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall for the dynamics of electoral competition in a simple Downsian model of repeated elections. The interplay between the median voter’s reference point and political parties’ choice of platforms generates a dynamic process of (de)polarization, following an initial shift in party ideology. This is consistent with the gradual nature of long-term trends in polarization in the US Congress.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:232:y:2024:i:c:s0047272724000082
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29