Policy and Theoretical Implications of the Zero-subsidy Bids in the German Offshore Wind Tenders

B-Tier
Journal: The Energy Journal
Year: 2020
Volume: 41
Issue: 4
Pages: 89-104

Authors (2)

Thomas Greve (not in RePEc) Marta Rocha (Government of Portugal)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The German offshore wind tender, launched in April 2017, resulted in three out of the four winning projects being delivered with zero subsidies, relying only on the wholesale price. This result has been regarded as a turning point for the industry. This paper analyses the 2017/18 German offshore wind tenders and the bidding strategies of the winning developers. We then propose a re-design of the tenders with the aim of achieving optimality/zero-subsidies and efficiency - two key properties in mechanism design. The paper contributes to the discussion on how to design offshore wind tenders with both a policy and theoretical perspective. This is of particular relevance given the rapid expansion of this type of investment in Europe and the use of auctions to select developers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:sae:enejou:v:41:y:2020:i:4:p:89-104
Journal Field
Energy
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29