Taxation under direct democracy

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2022
Volume: 200
Issue: C
Pages: 536-554

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Do citizens legislate different tax policies than parliaments? We provide quasi-experimental evidence for causal effects of direct democracy. Town meetings (popular assemblies) replace local councils in small German municipalities below a specific population threshold. RD and event study estimates consistently show that direct democracy comes with sizable but selective tax cuts. The burden of property taxes, which apply to all residents, decrease by some 10 to 15 percent under direct democracy. We do not find that business taxes change. Direct democracy allows citizens to design tax policies more individually than voting for a high-tax or low-tax party in elections.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:200:y:2022:i:c:p:536-554
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29