Interjurisdictional Spillovers, Decentralized Policymaking, and the Elasticity of Capital Supply

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 102
Issue: 5
Pages: 2349-57

Authors (2)

Thomas Eichner (not in RePEc) Marco Runkel (CESifo)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper points to the important role that the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency of policymaking in a decentralized economy with mobile capital and spillovers among jurisdictions. In accordance with previous studies, we show that under the assumption of a fixed capital supply (zero capital supply elasticity) the decentralized policy choice is optimal. If the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive, however, capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized equilibrium. (JEL E22, E61, H25, H77)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:5:p:2349-57
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29