Public choice and tort reform

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2005
Volume: 124
Issue: 1
Pages: 223-236

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The common law originally was thought to be immune to rent seeking. More recently, scholars have recognized that attorneys are engaged in exactly that activity. Rent seeking by the legal profession has greatly expanded the scope of US tort law, and generated efforts to reverse its expansion. Organized groups (attorneys, businesses and doctors) are active on both sides of the issue and the partisans have numerous tools available for advancing their agendas, such as litigating, lobbying for favorable rules and attempting to elect sympathetic legislators and judges. All of this creates an ideal setting for public choice analysis. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:1:p:223-236
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29