The electoral college and the rational vote

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1976
Volume: 27
Issue: 1
Pages: 101-107

Authors (2)

James Kau (not in RePEc) Paul Rubin

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We have shown first, that if the electoral college was abolished the theoretically measured power of voters would increase and second, that in presidential elections the measure of voting power used does in fact have a highly significant impact on the decision as to whether or not to vote. Thus, the analysis predicts that the abolition of the electoral college would have a significant impact on voter participation. From a policy viewpoint, if we view participation in elections as desirable, this could be used as an argument in favor of direct election of the president. From a scientific viewpoint, we are able to make a strong and unambiguous prediction about the results of a (possible) future event from theoretical considerations. If the electoral college should be abolished, it will be possible to test our predictions. In addition, we have provided a further test of the rational behavior view of electoral participation and have shown that this model applies to presidential elections. Finally, we have shown that the theoretical measure of voting power does predict actual behavior. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1976

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:27:y:1976:i:1:p:101-107
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29