Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2015
Volume: 136
Issue: C
Pages: 88-91

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static model where the buyer has private information about quality, sellers have private information about the cost and choice of effort, and quality is not contractible.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:88-91
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29