When Identifying Contributors is Costly: An Experiment on Public Goods

C-Tier
Journal: Southern Economic Journal
Year: 2016
Volume: 82
Issue: 3
Pages: 801-808

Authors (2)

Anya Samek (University of Southern Califor...) Roman M. Sheremeta (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Studies show that identifying contributors increases contributions to public goods. In practice, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing it. We design a public goods experiment in which participants can pay to view information about identities and contributions of group members. We compare this to a treatment in which there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are identified. Our main findings are that: (i) contributions in the treatment with costly information are as high as those in the treatment with free information, (ii) participants rarely choose to view the information, and (iii) being a high contributor is correlated with choosing to view information about others.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:soecon:v:82:y:2016:i:3:p:801-808
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29