Optimal Export Policy for a New-Product Monopoly.

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 1991
Volume: 81
Issue: 5
Pages: 1156-69

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A new welfare-enhancing role is identified for a policy of export subsidization in a new-product industry. An export-subsidy policy promotes the (rational) perception that a high-quality export can be provided at a relatively low price. Thus, an export subsidy generates a first-order benefit to welfare by enabling a high-quality export to be sold at a less-distorted high price. The subsidy will also introduce distortions into the price of a low-quality export and the quality-selection process. Since these choices are initially undistorted, however, the export-country welfare loss arising from new distortions is of second-order importance. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:5:p:1156-69
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24