Monopolistic Competition and Efficiency under Firm Heterogeneity and Nonadditive Preferences

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2023
Volume: 15
Issue: 4
Pages: 208-67

Authors (2)

Kyle Bagwell (Stanford University) Seung Hoon Lee (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider the single-sector version of the Melitz-Ottaviano model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. We characterize the first-best and market allocations. We find that the market provides the first-best level of entry but too little selection; hence, the market provides too many varieties and too little aggregate quantity, and allocates too little (much) production to low (high) cost realizations. Allowing for a broad family of quantity allocation functions, we establish sufficient conditions for the global optimality of the first-best solution. Several important extensions are also examined.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:208-67
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24