Advertising as Information: Matching Products to Buyers

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 1993
Volume: 2
Issue: 2
Pages: 199-243

Authors (2)

Kyle Bagwell (Stanford University) Garey Ramey (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider communication of quality via cheap talk and dissipative advertising expenditures, when consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality, and price information must be acquired through costly search. For search pods, cheap talk communicates quality when fixed costs are roughly constant across quality levels, while if fixed costs vary greatly with quality, then firms having the higher fixed‐cost quality level use dissipative advertising. For experience goods, quality can be communicated by cheap talk in a range where low‐quality firms have greater fixed costs, and low‐quality firms use dissipative advertising if their fixed costs are greater still.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:2:y:1993:i:2:p:199-243
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24