Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2014
Volume: 154
Issue: C
Pages: 562-577

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider deterministic evolutionary dynamics under imitative revision protocols. We allow agents to have different aspiration levels in the imitative protocols where their aspiration levels are not observable to other agents. We show that the distribution of strategies becomes statistically independent of the aspiration level eventually in the long run. Thus, long-run properties of homogeneous imitative dynamics hold as well, despite heterogeneity in aspiration levels.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:562-577
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29